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Increasing  tax  revenues  from the  enterprise  sector  alone  will not
solve  Poland's budget  crisis. As the state sector  shrinks  and the
private sector  grows,  the  tax net will get increasingly  leaky.  The
budgetary problem  could be ameliorated  by controlling social
security  expenses  and possibly  by abolishing  amortization  de-
ductions for state-owned  enterprises.
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This paper  - a product  of the  Transition  and Macro-Adjustment  Division,  Policy  Research  Department
- is part of a larger cepartmental  study on Enterprise  Behavior  and Economic  Reform  in Central  and
Eastem Europe. Copies of this paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW,
Washington,  DC'  20433.  Please  contact  Emily Khine,  room NI 1-065,  extension  37471  (September  1993,
32 pages).
Schaffer  analyzes  the causes of the collapse  of  in tum offset by an increase  in wage-indexed
profitability  in 1991  of the Polish enterprise  government  spending,  notably  on pensions.
sector.  He explores  how  it affecied  the govem-
ment budget  and assesses  the forecasts  of  As a result of all these  changes,  the govern-
enterprise  sector  performance  used to prepare  the  ment deficit increased  about  4 to 5 percent  of
govemment's 1990 and 1991  budgets.  CDP - about l,alf of the fiscal swing  between
1990  and 1991.
Schaffer  attributes  about  half of the drop in
profitability  to the decrease  in the inflation  rate  Policy  options Schaffer  recommends  for
and the consequent  decrease  in the inflation  bias  increasing  tax revenues  include  the following:
in profits that results from historical  cost ac-  (1) increasing  the turnover  tax and introducing
counting.  the value-added  tax that will replace  it at rates
that maintain  the increased  level of revenue;  (2)
He attributes  most of the rest of the collapse  increasing  the social security  tax rate; and (3)
in profitability  to higher labor  unit costs and  maintaining,  but not raising,  the historical  cost-
higher  amortization  allowances.  When  wages  are  based profit  tax, an automatic  stabilizer.
endogenized  in a simple  model,  nearly the entire
collapse  of profitability  is explained  by the  An obvious  alternative  to the profit tax based
changes  in inflation  bias and amortization  on historical  cost accounting  is to redress  a 1991
allowances.  mistake,  the Indexing  of amortization  deduc-
tions. Schaffer  recommends  drastically  reducing
The decrease  in the inflation  bias and the  or even abolishing  amortization  ueductions  for
increase  in amortization  allowances  caused  state-owned  enterprises  for fixed capital  acquired
profits, and thus profit  taxes,  to fall, freeing  up  before 1990  (before  the start  of the transition
cash that could be spent on wages,  causing  from socialism).  It is odd that these firms are
profits and profit taxes to fall even further.  This  given  a tax break on top of the free use of state-
loss in government  revenue  was offset by  owned  capital. If anytning,  they should be
increased revenues  from wage taxes, which  were  paying  for the use of the capital.
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i1. INTRODUCrlON
.n January 1990  Poland began  in earnest  its transition  from socialism. The first year of the Polish
reform program  saw a large number  of surprises, some good, some bad.  Prominent among  the s,irprises
was the government's success in gaining control over the fiscal deficit.  Indeed, this was a case of too
much of a good thing - the fiscal stance in 1990  was much tougher than planned (a general government
surplus of 3% of GDP, compared with planned approximate  balance), at a time when the contraction in
output was much larger than anticipated.  A second, related, surprise was the performance of the
enterprise sector.  Profits were considerably  higher than anticipated, thus contributing (via the large
dependence  of the budget on profit tax revenue)  to the fiscal surplus.
The second year of the Polish program saw some further surprises, and in particular, complete
reversals with respect to both the government  budget and enterprise profitability. Instead  of the planned
approximate  budget balance, the general government deficit in 1991 amounted to over 5% of GDP; a
swing of 8% of GDP from one year to the next.  At the same time the profitability of the enterprise
sector collapsed - from 23% (as a % of sales) in 1990  to only 7% in 1991 - and with it collapsed  profit
tax revenues. This year has seen a continuation  of these trends; profitability continues to be very low,
and the government budget deficit continues  to grow.
In this paper I will analyze the relationship between enterprise sector performance and the
government budget. The basic conclusions  are as follows.
*  First, the single largest contributor to the collapse in enterprise profitability in
1991 was a Uecline  in the inflation  rate, via a ciecline  in the ir.f,ation  bias in the
(historical  cost) profit figures.  About half of the entire profitability  drop is due
to this factor alone. Most of the rest of the drop is due to increases  in unit labor
costs and in amortization  allowances.
*  Second, the increase in unit labor costs can be seen as the result primarily  of the
decline in  the  inflation bias and  the  increase in  amortization allowances.
Movements  -in  these two items caused  large drops in profits and thus in profit tax
liabilities, thus (ceteris paribus) improving the net cash flow position of the
enterprise sector.  Workers have a dominant role in Polish enterprises, and so
this additional  cash was spent on wages, thus driving orofits down still further.
In this visw, nearly the entire drop in enterprise sector profitability  is the direct
or indirect result of the decline in the inflation bias and (to a lesser extent) the
increase in amortization  allowances.
*  Third, the impact of these developments on the government budget was as
follows. The direct impact  of the changes in the inflation bias and amortization
caused  profits, and thus profit taxes, to decline. The increase in unit labor costs
also caused profits and profit taxes to decline, but this loss in government
revenue was offset by an increase in revenues from wage taxes.  However, this
,ain h, wage tax revenues was in turn offset by an increase in wage-indexed
govennootEnt  snending, notably  pensions. The overall impact  of all these changes
on the bu.p  "as a loss in 1991 in net government revenue of about 4-5%  of
'DP,  i.e. ;A,>  half of the swirg in fiscal stance.
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The paper is organized as follows.  *A fter a brief summary  of taxes paid by the enterprise  sector,
I discuss  the problems  in interpreting  the statistics on enterprise  sector finance and how I try to cope with
them.  I  then analyze enterprise sector profitability, movements in wages, and the impact on the
government budget. This is followed  by a sectior ,"hich  compares the Finance Ministry's forecasts  of
enterprise sector profit performance for  1990 ard  1991 with the actual outcomes.  The final section
examines  some revenue-enhanXing  options the government  could consider adopting now.
II. ENTER?RISE  FiNANCE  AND  THE STRUCTURE
OF THE GOVERNMEN  BuDGET
As in most transition economies, government  revenues in Poland depend mostly on taxztion  of
the enterprise sector, which in turn is dominated  by state-owned  enterprises. In this section  I will briefly
describe the main sources of tax revenue deriving from the enterprise sector.  The data exclude the
private sector in 1988-90,  and the small-firm  sector in 1991.1 For ease of exposition, I will normalize
most quantities  by what I will call 'sales at producer prices", defined Ls "sales of own production"  net
of turnover taxes and subsidies. NB: "sales at -roducer prices" (as %ell  as "sales of own production")
was roughly the same magnitude  as nominal GDP in 1990-91.
The main sources of revenue are as follows:
A.  Turnover tpx
This is a tax on enterprise sales.  The rate is variable by product, with a large portion (40% in
1990) coming from taxes on just three products (alcohol, tobacco, and petroleum products).  Including
these items, the average rate of turnover tax in 1990-91  was 5-5.5%.2
B.  Profit tax (lit. "income  tax")
This a fixed-rate  tax on enterprise profits.  Profit ("wynik finansowy", lit. "financial  result") is
defined in terms of historical costs, net of turnover tax, subsidies, and depreciation allowances.  The
statutory rate was lowered  to 40% in 1989 in conjunction  with the introduction  of the so-called "dividend
tax".  The average  rate of profit twx  for profit-makers  (tax due as a percentage of profit) in 1990-91  was
about 37%.  Profit tax due was about 8-9% of sales in 1990 and fell sharply (together with profits) to
4-5% in 1991.
1.  Firms with fifty or fewer employees  in industry  and construction,  twenty or fewer in other sectors, vre not covered
in the 1991  data.  Data for 1988-90  cover the "socialized  sector' only, i.e. the state and cooperative  sectors.
2.  Turnover tax revenues  as a percentage  of "sales  of own production".Polish Rical Crist  3
C.  The "dividend"
This tax was introduced  in 1989. It is a tax Lased4  on that portion of the enterprise's capital that
was centrally-financed  ("fundusz  zaloczycielski",  lit. "founder's fund").  It was introduced  as a socialist
attempt to mimic capitalist dividend  payments  (hence the .iarne) and is paid out of profit.  The dividend
as  a percentage of sales has been about 1-2  %  in recent years, but  the burden of  the tax varies
considerably from enterprise to enterprise.  There is also an entirely separate small tax on real estate,
equivalent  to less than 1  % of sales.
D.  Tax on excessive wage Increases ("popiwek" or "PPWW")
This tax has becn present, under a variety of names, since dhe early 1980s. The tax penalizes
firms which pay wage bills (in 1990)  or average wages (in 1991)  aoove a certain norm.  It ia a tax-based
incomes policy (TIP) tool, and as such was not originally intended  to raise large amounts of revenue.
It is paid out of profit.'  In 1990  the popiwek applied to the entire enterprise sector; starting in 1991, it
applied to the state-owned  sector only.  It amounted  to about 2% of sales in 1990-91.
E.  Payroll taxes
There were three such taxes in operatit i in Poland:
1.  Social  security contibutiors.  These were paid at a statutory  rate of 43  % of the wage bill
(raised to 45% in 1992). T,ie av-rage rate was about 38  % in 1990-91. The 'evenues
from this tax went to the state pension fund (ZUS) and not to the state budget.
2.  Wage taxes.  These were paid at a statutory rate of 20%; the average rate was about
19%.  A portion of the revenues  was used to finance local government  budgets.
3.  Contributions  to the  7laborfur I',  a 2% payroll tux introduced in 1990 to help finance
unemployment  expenditures.
In 1992, as part of the personal taxation  reform and the introduction  of personal income tax, wage taxeu
were abolished  and a PAYE (pay-as-you-earn)  taxation system was introduced at the enterprise level.
Table 1 summarizes  the magnitudes  of these taxes, along with other key data.  The ro:a of the
enterprise sector in the development  in the fiscal crisis is not immediately  apparent; profit tax revenues
collapsed in 1991, but much of this was offset by an increase in other taxes, notably  wage-related  taxes.
I begin the analysis  with profits and profit taxes.  The collapse in profit tax revenues  was caused by the
collapse in enterprise profits; but the explanation  of why profits collapsed  is much less straightforward.
3.  In some stistical  sourmcs  it is included  as part of profit tax in 1989 only.4  PoUsh  Fisc4l  Crisis
Table 1:  T'axes  paid by the enterprise  sector
(as a percentage  of sales at producer prices)
1988  1989  1990  1991
Turnover tax  7.1  6.8  5.0  5.6
Profit tax  7.9  8.8  8.4  4.5
Dividend  1.°  1.8  1.7
TIP  0.5  1.8  2.0  2.8
Payroll taxes  6.7*  7.2*  6.6  8.5
of which
Wage taxes  2.2  2.5  2.1  2.7
Social security and labor fund  4.4*  4.7*  4.5  5.8
Real estate tax  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.8
All taxes above  22.6  26.2  24.2  24.0
Net indirect taxes  -0.3  -07  1.1  2.9
(turnover  tax minus subsidies)
Memorandum  items:
Sales of own productioti (bn zi)  48541  153768  805397  1001933.
" at "producer  prices'  (bn zi)  48704  154874  796845  974137
Nominal GDP (bn zi)  29629  118319  606726  940300
General government  surplus/deficit
as % of GDP  0.0  -6.0  3.1  -5.3
Industrial price index inflation
(% increase, December-December)  75.5  653.0  192.9  35.7
* Estimate
III.  MAMNG SENSE  OF POLISH  PROFTS
The main problem with interpreting  the published  data4  on enterprise profits is that historical  cost
accounts  (HCA)  suffer from an inflation  bias, and during the period in question  inflation  in Poland rapidly
accelerated  and then decelerated  (Table 1).  The inflation bias results from the lag between the time at
which an input is purchased  and the time at which the output that ermbodies  the input  is sold. If the price
level increases  during this period, the pr duct will look like it generated  large profits for the enterprise -
input costs were low relative to the selling price - but this is an illusion. These are just 'paper profits",
4.  The main source of data on the enterprise  sector used in this paper is the Polish Central Statistical  Office.  Th  ee  d
ata are supplemented  with data from the Ministry  of Finance.PoUsh  FLvcaJ  Crbis  5
since if the firm is to continue as a going concern, the inputs that are used up must be replaced at the
current, higher, price level.
Not subject to this inflation bias are profits expressed on a cash flow (CF) basis, in which ar.
input is counted  as a cost when thes  expendititre  on the input'  kes  place.  Approximate  cash flow for the
enterprise sector can be derived from the published historical cost accounts, inventory data, and an
accounting  identity; see the Appendix  for details ar.d some worked-ouit  examples. 5 The intuition  behind
the calculation  is that the while inflation  biases historica  material costs downwards, it simlLtaneously
biases nominal inventory accumulation  upwards, and these biases are identical!:y  equal (except for the
sign).
The result of  applying this calcilation is a series which I  sLall call,  with some abuse of
terminology, "cash  flow".'  It difters from the standard  HCA profit series ("wynik finansowy",  the profit
tax base) in three ways:
1.  The 'cash flow" series does not suff4r from an inflation bias.  Everything  is in current
terms.
2.  Real inventory accumulation  (decumulation,  will decrease (increase) cash flow but will
have no effect on HCA profits.
3.  As is standard with cash flow figures, amortization  deductions  have been added  back in.
Everything else counted as a cost or a revenue (e.g. interest charges, wages, financial incomes of all
sorts) in HCA profits is also counted in the cash flow series.
Figure 1 shows the results of applying  this adjustnent to profits in the Polish enterprise
sector.  The difference between the HCA and cash flow series is dramatic.  HCA profitability (profits
as a percent of sales at producer prices) was very high in 1989 and 1990, and collapsed in 1991. Cash
flow profitability, by contrast, shows a much smaller drop in 1991.
Another useful and inflation-bias-free  measure of profit is profit calculated on a current-cost-
accounting  (CCA)  basis. This is similar to HCA profit except  that it uses current prices of inputs instead
of the (historical)  prices actually paid.  The differences  bctween CCA profit and cash flow a&e:
1.  Real accumulation  (decumulation)  of inventories  decreases (increases)  cash flow but has
no effect on CCA profit.
2.  Again, cash flow is gross of depreciation  and CCA profit is net.  CCA profit measures
the profitability of production, whereas cash flow measures the cash earned by the
enterprise.
S.  I should  note that the method  of calculating  cash  flow  is correct in principle,  but may suffer from problems  in practice.
It is therefore  beat  treAted  as an approximation.
6.  This "cash  flow' series is basically 'net cash itow from current operations", but  with the difference  that extraordinary
profits and losses  are  included. Extrordinary profits  nd losses  cannot  be straightforwardly  separated  out beawusethey
include  paper capital gains from explicit inventory  revaluations,  and these  must be left in for the derivation  of cah
flow to work. Sx  the Appendix.6  PoUsh  FLsc  Criss
Flgure 1
Profitability  in  the  Enterprise  Sector  1969-91
Profit/sales  Tr,  producer  prices,  irn  %
5o  \
40  --  --
20-  - - - - - - - - - -
10
1969.01  02  03  04 1990.01  02  03  04 1991.01  02  C3  04
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The relationships between CCA profit, HCA profit, and cash flow are summarized in the
following  box.
Unfortunately,  we have no direct data on real accumulation  of inventories;  this must be estimatud
from nominal inventory data.  I do this by deflating nominal inventory data with a weighted moving
average of the industrial  price index. A fuller description  of the ..iethod  used to calculate  real inventory
accumulation  is giveu in the Appendix.
The key assumption  in the process is the estimate of the average life in invent^ry - the time
between the purchase of materials and the sale of goods - in the entire Polish enterprise sector.  The
problem is that inflation was extremely rapid at a crucial period - late  1989 and early 1990.  The
estimates of real inventory accumulation  for 1989 and 1990 are therefore rather sensitive to the choice
of the length of the moving average.
Estimates  of the average life in inventory  for the entire enterprise sectot, and the corresponding
weighted  price deflators,  are derived in the Appendix. Adjustments  and allowances  are made  for:  (1) the
Polish definition  of sales ("sales of own production"),  which understaies  Ui'i  volu,;  v; .vaW  turnover  byPolih Fiscal  Crisis  7
CCA Profit. HCA Profit and Cash Flow
1.  Standard definitions
HCA prL3t
- IB





2.  Gross of amortization
HCA profit (gross of amortization)
- IB
- CCA profit (gross of amortization)




HCA profit  *  Profit calculatea  on an historical  cost accounting  basis (standard  profit
reported in the Polish statistics)
CCA profit  *  Profit calculated  on a current cost accounting  basis
CF  *  Cash flow
about 50%;7  (2) the strLuture  of inventories (materials spend a longer time in inventory than finished
goods); (3) the inflation  bias in inventory valuation; and (4) the costing of inventories (they are valued
at cost and not in terms of potent.al sales revenue).  The results of the calculations  suggest an average
life in inventory of 1 to 3 months, with numbers towards the lower end of the spectrum perhaps more
likely.
The range of estimates  of real inventory accumulation  presented here correspond to the range of
estimated inventory life:  1-month  inventory  life; 2-month  inventory life; and 3-month inventory life.
7.  The reason is that to calculate  "sales  of own production' a large portion  of turnover  (notably  in reuil trade) is summed
over profit margins and not gross turnover.  See the Appendui.8  PoW  Racal  CHL4z
Table 2:  Real inventories in the Polish enterprise sector
1988  1989  1990  1991
End-year inventories
1 January 1988 =  100
Assumed  IL =  1 month  92.9  58.5  55.3  51.1
Assumed  IL = 2 months  93.8  64.9  55.6  50.8
Assumed  IL = 3 months  94.0  67.1  55.8  50.8
Real inventory  accumulation
as a % of start-year inventories
Assumed  IL  =  1 month  -7.1  -37.0  -5.4  -10.1
Assumed  IL =  2 months  -6.2  -30.8  -14.2  -11.1
Assumed  IL =  3 months  -6.0  -28.7  -16.8  -11.4
IL =  inventory  life
Memorandum  item:
Industrial sales growth, in %  4.9  -1.4  -25.6  -14.2
(1988-90  - not incl. private sector
19I  - not incl. firms with <  6 employees
Compare with note 1.)
'Te  estimates  for real inventory  accumulation  are given in Table 2.  As expected, the choice of
deflator has the biggest effect on the estimates for 1989 and 1990.  Note, however, that the year-end
point estimates for  1990 and  1991 are not much affected.  The picture is one of major inventory
decumulation  in 1989-90  and 1991; at the end of 1991, inventories  amounted to about 50% of their pre-
1989 level, perhaps somewhat  less than the fall in enterprise sector output as captured in the statistics.
The inventory accumulation  and profit figures are combined  in Table 3 to yield estimates  of the
inflation  bias and of real profitability.  Several checks on the consistency  and plausibility  of the results
are given in the Appendix.  An additional check is the results of Barbone (1992), who uses a different
method to calculate  the inflation  bias for assumed  inventory lives of three and six months.  His estimate
for three months is fairly close to the corresponding  estimate presented in this paper.
S.  Some of the drop may be caused by decreased  coveragc  of the enterprise sector in 1991. See note 1.Polish Fucal Crisis  9
IV. MOVEMENTS IN PROFITS 1990-91
From Table 3 we can see that HCA profitability fell by over  16% in  1991 to only 7%,  CF
profitability  by less than 3% (to about 10%), and CCA profitability  by something  like 6%-8% (depending
on the estimate  of inventory accumulation). The task in this section is to 'explain", or, more properly,
"account for' these changes.
The basic data are presented in Table 3.  As before, all quantities are measured as a percent of
sales at producer prices.
A.  The inflation bias
The first surprise is that the biggest  contribution  to the fall in profitability  in 1991  was the decline
in the inflation  bias.  The estimates  of the inflation  bias in 1990 are very large whatever  the assumption
made about inventory life - it added from  13% to  17% to HCA profitability that year.  With the
slowdown  in inflation in 1991 came a sharp fall in the inflation  bias to about 5-6%. The decrease in the
inflation  bias contributed  about 8-10% to the total fall in profitability.
B.  Labor costs
Unit labor costs (wages and payroll taxes as a percentage  of sales at producer prices) increased
substantially  in 1991, and caused  profitability  to drop by 4-5%. The second surprise (given  the attention
given to the wage increase by many analysts)  is therefore that the role played by unit labor costs in the
profitability squeeze  was secondary.
The increase in unit labor costs in  1991 was only partly the result of an ineffective incomes
policy.  Had the TIP held and the average wage stayed at the limit allowed by the TIP scheme, average
wages would have been about 10% lower in 1991  than they actually were.  This would have meant an
increase in ULC to about 20%, or an increase of 2%.
How is this possible, given that the TIP scheme in 1991  limiLed  average wage increases  to 60%
of the increase in the CPI and that the fall in employment  was almost as iarge as the fall in output? The
reason is that the CPI increased significantly  faster than the producer price index.  Average annual real
consumption  wages (nominal  wages deflated  by the CPI) were virtually the same in 1991  as in 1990, but
product wages  (measured  as the wage deflated  by the industrial  price index) increased  by over 10%. We
can interpret the increase in unit labor costs as the result of Polish workers trying to maintain living
standards at the expense  of profits.  For more on this in a cross-courtry comparative  context, see Estrin,
Schaffer and Singh (1992).
C.  Amortization  allowances
The third surprise is the large role played by arnortization  ai.owances  in the profitability  decline.
These tax deductions increased dramatically at the start of 1991 as a result of inflation indexation,  and
account for 34%  of the drop in HCA profitability.10  PoLish  Fiscal Crisis
Table 3:  Profitability and the ;nflation bias
All quantities  are measured as a percentage of sales at producer prices, except where noted.
1988  1989  1990  1991
HCA profitability  16.9  34.9  23.6  7.1
Amortization  2.6  1.2  3.4  6.8
HCA gross of amortization  19.6  36.1  27.0  13.9
CF  10.5  12.3  13.8  10.5
ULC  19.1  21.1  18.0  22.6
IB+IA (m  gross HCA - CF)  9.0  23.8  13.2  3.5
Inventory  accumulation
Assumed  IL =  1 month  -1.2  -8.5  -0.4  -1.9
Assumed  IL =  2 months  -1.1  -7.9  -2.1  -2.1
Assumed IL =  3 months  -1.1  -7.5  -2.7  -2.3
Inflation bias
Assumi  IL =  1 month  10.3  32.3  13.6  5.4
Assumed  IL = 2 months  10.2  31.7  15.3  5.6
Assumed  IL =  3 months  10.1  31.3  15.8  5.7
CCA profitability  gross of amortization
Assumed  IL =  1 month  9.3  3.8  13.4  8.6
Assumed  IL =  2 months  9.4  4.4  11.7  8.3
Assumed  IL = 3 months  9.4  4.8  11.2  8.2
CCA profitability
Assumed  IL =  1 month  6.6  2.6  10.1  1.7
Assumed  IL = 2 months  6.8  3.2  8.4  1.5
Assumed  IL = 3 months  6.8  3.6  7.8  1.4
Taxation of lB as % of nominal GDP
Assumed  IL =  I month  7.9  10.7  6.4  3.5
Assumed  IL =  2 months  7.8  10.5  7.1  3.6
Assumed  IL = 3 months  7.8  10.4  7.4  3.7
Amortization  allowances  are set by the Ministry of Finance. The drop in HCA profits caused  by
the increase in these allowances  and the consequent  drop in profit tax revenues is therefore in some sense
self-inflicted. I will return to this point later in the paper.Poih  Fscal Crisis  11
D.  Zloty appreciation
One of the reasons the CPI increased faster than the PPI in 1991 was because of the use of the
exchange rate as a 'nominal anchor" in macro policy. From January 1990  to May 1991  the zloty/dollar
rate was fixed in nominal terms; since the domestic price level continued to increase following price
liberalization  this amounted  to a substantial  appreciation  of the zloty. The zloty appreciated  in real terms
in 1991 by 25% compared to 1990.  Furthermore, import prices increased in 1991 more than export
prices.
A guesstimate  of the effect of the zloty appreciation  on profitability  can be had as follows. Write
profitability as the difference between domestic and export sales and domestic and import costs, as a
percentage  of total sales:
T  pOyD+P'yZ  -.  . cD..P'c
S  p  pD  y  +p
po 
YD+ tUyr
Take first differences  holding  output constant, ignore the effect of changes  in relative  prices on the value
of total output, and we get
A(P)Yx  - A(z
To get the approximate effect of the zloty devaluation on profitability, we use the following
numbers: 9
C' - 75yY'  - - .16
y
The export price index increased by 14% in 1991, and the import price index, 20%.  For the domestic
price level we take the price index for consumer  goods (up by 60% in 1991). Plug all these numbers in
and we find that, ceteris paribus, changes in relative export and import prices decreased  profitability by
maybe 1%-2% in 1991.
E.  The cost of credit
Published enterprise sector data unfortunately  do not include interest costs as a separate item for
1990. However, I have tried to estimate the scale of interest charges using NBP aggregate  credit and
interest rate data.  The results suggest that "unit credit costs" (interest payments divided by sales) were
about  the same magnitude  in 1990  and 1991; perhaps these costs were slightly  lower in 1991. I conclude,
9.  Thewe  figures are taken  from a 1988 input/output  table  (GUS 1990) with a 30% downwards  adjustmcnt  for gross
enterprise sector  output.12  Polih Fiscal  Cris
somewhat  tentatively,  that there is not much  of a direct role for char'ges  in the cost of credit in explaining
the 1991 profit collapse.
F.  Taxes and subsidies
In Poland as in other transition countries, subsidies have been cut drastically in recent years.
However, the bulk of the Polish subsidy cuts took place before January 1990. Net indirect taxes from
the enterprise sector (turnover taxes minus subsidies) fell further in 1991, but the change was relatively
small; net taxes as a percentage of sales went from 1.1% the previous year to 2.9% (Table 1).  In any
case the net effect on profits of subsidy  cuts/net tax increases would depend  on what happened  to prices.
For example, subsidy cuts could lead to higher profits if price controls are lifted and furms  exercise
monopoly  power.
G.  'Extraordinary  profits and losses'
This is a mystery item in the enterprise financial accounts.  It includes, for example, capital
gains/losses on hard currency holdings, interest on overdue credits, capital gains on explicit inventoiy
revaluations, etc.  In 1989 it was very large (8% as a percent of sales), apparently largely because of
capital gains on hard currency holdings. In 1990 it was much smaller but still positive, and in 1991 it
became significantly  negative.  It is not clear how to interpret this, however, and more information  is
needed here.'"  Table 4 summarizes  the above  results:
Table 4:  The 1991 Collapse in Proritability - Sources
Fall in HCA profitability  -16.5
Estimated effects of:
Increase in amortization  allowances  -3.5
Increase in ULC  -4.7
Decrease ir. inflation  bias  -8 to -10
Changes in relative import/export  prices  -1 to -2
Total:  -17 to -20
10.  For example,  as inflation  declined, inventory  revaluations  carried out by enterprises would hav  resulted (c.p.) in
smaller  (paper)  capital  gains snd smaler extraordinary  profits.  But this would not affect HCA profit over a longer
period,  since  the effect  of the revaluation  would be to bring forward  the inflation  bias that would be realized  anyway
when the revalued  inventories  were later sold.Po&£h  Fiscal  CrLui  13
The actual fall in HCA profitability is very close to the lowe  end of the cumulative  effects of the above
factors.  Since the main source of uncertainty in the above estimates is the size of the change in the
inflation bias, this suggests that the lower of the inflation bias estimates for 1990 may be the more
accurate.
V.  A NOTE IN PASSING:  INVENTORY  ACCUMULATON
IN TllE NATIONAL  AccouNT
The national  accounts  produced by the Central Statistical  Office are also severely affected  by an
inflation  bias, especially  the national  accounts in current prices.  This can be seen from Table 5, which
compares  changes in stocks from the national  accounts  with the estimates  of real inventory accumulation
in the enterprise  sector described above (nb: the enterpr  ise sector accounts  for the bulk of inventories  in
the economy).
Table 5:  Inventory accumulation and the national accounts
1988  1989  1990  1991
Own calculations:
Inventory  accumulation
as a % of nominal GDP
Assumed  IL =  1  month  -1.9  -10.3  -0.5  -1.9
Assumed  IL = 2 months  -1.8  -9.6  -2.6  -2.2
Assumed  IL = 3 months  -1.7  -9.1  -3.3  -2.3
Inflation bias
as a % of nominal GDP
Assumed  IL =  1 month  15.3  38.6  15.7  5.6
Assumed  IL = 2 months  15.1  37.9  17.8  5.9
Assumed  IL = 3 months  15.1  37.4  18.5  6.0
CSO national  accounts data:
(From Rocznik  Statystyczny 1991, p. 119)
Changes in stocks
as % of nominal GDP  10.1  22.1  11.3  n.a.
Changes in stocks
as % of constant  price GDP  5.1  6.9  2.5  n.a.14  Polish  Fiscal  Crisis
The inflation bias in the national accounts is clearly visible: substantial increas  in stocks are
implausible,  especially  for 1989-90. How much the inflation  bias amounts  to would depend  on precisely
how GDP was calculated.
VI. PRoFrrs, TAX REVENUE  AND WAGE BEHAVIOR
In  a  separate paper  (Schaffer 1992) I  describe how,  at  the  start  of  the  government's
stabilization/liberalization  program (January 1990), the enterprise se_tor was hit with large profit tax
liabilities  resulting from the infPation  bias.  This fiscal crunch contributed  to the decline in real wages -
to come up with the money to pay their profit taxes, enterprises  held down wager in.  rder to boost cash
flow - and thus to the large output fall that was observed in earlv 1990.  Here I want to argue that the
inflation bias played a critical role in both the profit collapse anki  the lack of wage restraint observed in
1991.
Table 6 summarizes  the direct effect of changes  in the inflation  bias on profit tax revenues." 1 We
do this by dividing profit tax liabilities of the enterprise sector according to the estimated contribution
of the inflation bias to HCA profits.  These estimates  suggest that tax revenues from the inflation  bias
were very large in 1989 and 1990; about 10-11% of GDP in 1989 and 6-7% of GDP in 1990.  The
contribution of the inflation bias to profit tax revenues fell sharply in 1991, amounting to a loss in
revenues  of about 3-4% of GDP.
Table 6:  Taxation of the inflation bias as a % of nominal GDP
1988  1989  1990  1991
Assumed  IL =  1 month  7.9  10.7  6.4  3.5
Assumed  IL = 2 months  7.8  10.5  7.1  3.6
Assumed  IL = 3 months  7.8  10.4  7.4  3.7
But the decline in the inflation bias had a further, indirect effect on profit tax revenues by
allowing an increase in unit labor costs.  Ceteris paribus, a decreas,e  in the inflation bias increases net
cash flow (cash flow after taxes paid out of profit).  But ceteris is not paribus, and increased net cash
flow meant more scope for wage increases.  The improvement in net cash flow resulting from the
decrease in the burden of inflation  bias taxation could be transferred to workers in the form of wages.
The increase in amortization  allowances  had a similar indirect effect.
11.  Profit tax in 1989  is adjusted  so that the inclusion  of the popiwek in profit tax in thut year alone is netted out.Polish  Fiscal Crisis  15
Figures 2 and 3 reconstruct the division of the enterprise sector surplus for 1990 and 1991,
respectively.  The surplus is defined as wage income plus retained profit plus taxes.' 2 It is, roughly
speaking, value added, gross of depreciation and on a cash basis - funds available for payments to
employees,  taxes, and retained profit."  The charts show that labor's share of the surplus increased in
1991, but not at the expense of retained profit, which was very low in both 1990  and 1991. Rather, the
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The impact  of wage behavior can be formalized  in the simplest  of models in the following  way. In 1990
and 1991  retained profit - cash flow after all taxes and wage bonuses  - was near zero.  Let us assume  this
is  a  behavioral relationship that describes wage movements: taking output,  employment, etc.  as
exogenous,  wages are set so as to drive net cash flow down to someconstant,  which we take as zero (the
comparative  statics do not change if this constant takes other value)."
12.  Retained  profit is calculated  as a residual  (cash flow minus taxes out of profit minus estimated  wage bonuae.)
13.  I do not have figures for spcnding on in-kind payments to workers (e.g. the housing fund) for 1991, so this is not
included  in the definition  of the surplus.
14.  This is rather simple way of  modelling  the Polish enterprise as  a  "worker-controlled  firm"; retined  profit for
investment  is exogenous,  workers are the residual  claimant.  For more on the nature of the Polish enterprise  and the
economic  cunsequences  see  e.g.  Calvo and Coricelli 1992, Berg and Blanchard  1992, DaEbrowski,  Federowicz  and
Levitas 1992, Frydman and Wellisz 1991,  Schaffer 1992.16  PoUsh  Fiscal  Crisi
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We have the following relationships  (we ignore wage bonuses and, as before, we normalize  by
sales):
CF=  HCA+A-IB-IA
RP =  CF - PTAX - DIV - TIP
PTAX =  t,HCA
where PTAX is profit tax, levied at a rate of t,, RP is retained profit, DIV is the dividend  tax, TIP is the
tax-based incomes policy tax (the "popiwek").  Set RP=O, substitute and rearrange and we get the
following  expression for HCA profit:
HCA - 11 [IB+l-A-+DIV+T7P
The average profit tax rate in 1990  was 37%.  In 1991, a significant  number of firms were lossmakers
and so their marginal tax rate was zero.  For our comparative statics exercise we take 30% as the
marginal  tax rate over 1990-91.1' This gives us a value for the "multiplier" 1/(l-t,) of 1.43.
Table 7 summarizes the direct and indirect impact of changes in the variables on enterprise
profitability. The cumulative impact of 1990-91  changes in all the variables is a drop of 18% in HCA
profitability, which is about what actually  happened."' The changes in the inflation  bias and in inventory
accumulation  cannot  be separately  identified  very accurately,  but this is not a problem  with the cumulative
is.  Gross  losses were between 1/4 and 1/3 of gross profits in 1991; gross  losses  were virtually  nil in 1990.  So we take
as the marginal  tax rate .5 *  37% +  S5  *  (1/3 *  0 + 2/3 *  37%) m 30%.
16.  This is not a coincidence,  since our behavioral assumption  of constant  (small) retained profit wu  roughly what  was
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effect (recall  that IB+IA  - HCA+A-CF).  Most of the change in profitabilitv is driven by the drop in
the inflation bias and the increase in amortization  allowances. Taking into account the indirect impac
of wages we find that the full impact on Table 7 summarizes  the direct and indirect impact of changes
in the variables  on enterprise profitability. The cumulative  impact  of 1990-91  changes  in all the variables
is a drop of 18% in HCA profitability, which is about what actually happened." 7 The changes in the
inflation  bias and amortization  allowances  alone would  have been -15% and -18%.  In other words, we
can explain most or all of the 1991 collapse in profitability with these two factors alone, and with the
inflation  bias as the single most important  factor.  Conversely, the large inflation  bias in 1990 was the
key reason for that year's low unit labor costs and high CCA (as well as HCA) profits.
Table 7:  Direct and Indirect Impact of Changes In Various Factors
on Enterprise Sector profitability In 1990-91
All quantities  are measured as a percentage  of sales at producer prices.
,WB  -8 to -10  I
1-9.7  l
AIA  -2to  0  -'  l  -13.1  l
AA  -3.5  '  -12.6  *  1.43 =  18
ADIV  -0.1 
ATIP  +0.8  I
Identifying the impact on the government budget is somewhat  more involved.  Calculating  the
direct impact on profit tax revenue of the decline in the inflation bias and the increase in amortization
allowances  is simple (a loss in revenues of about 34% of GDP).  However, wages are taxed, and so an
upward movement  in wages will uoth cause profit tax revenue to fall (the indirect impact coi  profit tax
revenue) and wage tax revenue to rise.
Ignoring for the moment the popiwek, we can estimate  the effect on tax revenues of a change in
unit labor costs as follows.  Let
t,  =  tax rate on profits
t2 =  (combined)  payroll  tax rates
R  =  total revenue from taxation of wages and profits
w  =  profits
w  =  wage
17.  This is not a coincidence,  since our behavioral assumptior  of constant (small) retained profit was roughly what was
actually  observed.18  Polsh FWsc Crisb
L  =  employment
Then
R =  t,ir + tLwL
A straightforward  calculation  shows that
dR =  d(wL) *  (t2  - t,t2 - t,)
An increase in wage costs will increase  tax revenue if
(t2 - t1t2 - tl)  >  O
i.e. if
t2  >  tl/(1-t,)
('he  calculation  is the same if we divide through by sales and talk about changes in terms of unit labor
costs.)
In 1990 the effective profit tax rate was 37%, and so t,/(1-t,) is about 0.59.  This is about the
same as the average combined payroll tax rates in 1990.  Thus according to the above approximaton,
an increase in wage costs will, ceteris paribus, have little effect on total tax revenue. However, we have
to take into account two additional  factors.
*  First, when the popiwek is binding, the marginal tax rate on wages is very high.  In
comparing 1990 with 1991 this is probably not very important.  The TIP bit about as
hard in 1991 as it did in 1990 - the ratio of TIP taxes to wage bills was about the same
in both years (19-20%).
*  Second, many enterprises were loss-making in  1991 (according to HCA profit) and
therefore incurred no profit tax liabilities at all.  The marginal profit tax rate for an
enterprise that is loss-making  is zero.  An increase in wage costs in a loss-maker  would
therefore unambiguously increase tax revenue, since payroll tax  obligations would
increase and profit tax obligations  would remain zero.  For our comparative  statics, we
take (as before) t,=0.30  in 1990-91,  t2=0.59 and we find that dR = d(wL) * 011
If we divide through by sales, we have the increase in tax revenue as a percentage  of sales in terms of
the change in unit labor costs.  The result of this calculation  is that the increase in unit labor costs in
1991  probably increased tax revenue by something  like 'A of one percent of sales, or 'h of one percent
of GDP, a not inconsiderable  amount.
However, although  the change  in the division  of the enterprise surplus in 1991 led to an increase
in gross tax revenue, it had the opposite  effect on the government budget surplus.  The reason for this
is the following. The tax revenue from these various taxes ends up in different places: the tax on wages
and the profit tax go into the state budget, social security tax revenue goes to the state pension scheme,
and labor fund tax revenue goes to a separate unemployment  compensation  fund.  But pensions andPol&h  Racal  CrLfLi 19
unemployment  compensation  are linked to the average wage, so that increased  tax revenue  resulting from
increased wages is automatically  offset by increased  spending on these items.
We can calculate  the size of these changes  in distribution as follows. Consider what happens to
the main government  budget. The  average wage tax rate is 19% (t2=0. 19); as before, t1=0.30.  In that
case we have
dR = d(wL) *  %-O.17)
So the effect on the main government  budget, ceteris paribus, was an increase in the deficit amounting
to something  like 3/4 of one percent of GDP. Ir fact, the drain on the budget was somewhat  larger than
this.  In  1990 the average pension was 54% of the average wage; in  1991 the pension/wage ratio
increased to 59%, i.e. pensions rose even faster than wages.  Furthermore, the number of pensioners is
increasing (by 12% in 1991, to 7.9 million), the unemployment  rate is increasing  (from 6% in 1990  to
12% in 1991), and employment  in the enterprise sector is decreasing (by about 10% in 1991, to about
6.8 million). In 1991 the budgetary  subsidy the sociJ insurance funds increased from 3.2% to 4.6% of
GDP, i.e. by rather more than our estimate of the effect of the wage increase alone.
To suinmarize  this section: with a simple model of wage behavior we can explain virtually the
entire collapse in profitability in  1991 as the result of changes in the inflation bias (the single most
important  factor), and amortization  allewances  (plus some other minor factors). The government  budget
was affected in two ways.  First,  the decline in the inflation bias and the increase in amortization
allowances  caused profits and hence profit tax revenues  to fall.  The direct etfftct  was a loss in revenue
amounting to about 3-4% of GDP.  Second, wages increased in response to  the fall in profit tax
liabilities. The effect of this increase in wages was an increase in government  revenue, but this was more
than offset by a-i increase in government  spending via the indexation  of social security expenditures  to
the wage.  The cost to the budget was about 3/4 of one percent of GDP.
The total impact of all this on the government  budget amounted  to an increase in the deficit of
about 4-5% of GDP.  In fact, the general governnurit balance (on a commitment  basis) went from a
surplus of 3.1% in 1990 to a deficit of 5.3% in 1991, so about one-half of the swing can be accounted
for b) the factors listed above.
VII.  FoREcASTING  TAx REVENUES:  WHAT WENT WRONG?
In the previous sections  I have looked  at the mechanics  of how developments  in enterprise  finance
contributed to the emergence of the Polish fiscal crisis.  In this section I ask the question of whether
mistakes in forecasting  enterprise finance contributed  to the crisis.
Table 8 presents forecasted  vs. actual  data for enterprise  finance (some tigures may differ slightly
from those presented earlier because of small differences  in coverage). The forecasts arc those made by
the Ministry of Finance when preparing the government  budget.
The profit forecast for 1990  was too low, even though amortization  deductions  were higher than
forecast. Basic HCA profitability (before  amortization  deductions)  turned out to be almost 7 percentage20  PoUsh  Feal  Chists
points higher than forecast.  Unit labor costs were, however, forecast fairly accurately.  The forecast
error for 1990  therefore amounts  to an underestimate  of the inflation bias.  It is difficult  to criticize this
error, however; not only is the inflation  bias difficult  to estimate  even ex post, but inflation  in 1990  was
in fact higher than forecast.
The 1991  budget ft recasted  HCA profitability  as the same as actual profitability  the previous year
(23.5% vs. 23.79%);  the reality was quite different, as we have seen.  The first point to note is that HCA
profit gross of amortization allo%  ances was actually predicted to increase in 1991 by about 3%, thus
offsetting the increase in amortization  allowances. Part of the forecasted increase was to come from a
predicted decrease in unit labor costs, but most of it (about  2%) was to come from elsewhere.
Say that the forecast of 1991 unit labor costs had been correct (i.e. 16.8% instead  of 22.6%).
Then, ceteris paribus, actual  profitability  in 1991  would  have been 12-13%,  i.e. about 10-11%  below the
forecast.  Also recall that above we estimnated  the fall in the inflation bias in 1991 as about 8-10% of
sales.  Thus most of the misforecast for profitability amounts to a  failure to allow for a fall in the
inflation  bias.
Unlike the forecast error t.  previous .ar,  the  1991 profit forecast can,  in my view,  be
justifiably criticized  as excessively  optirmistic.  It asumed implicitly  that the inflation  bias would not fall,
but at the same time inflation was prt'dicved  to fall.  It also should have been clear from the past history
of the enterprise sector that 20% + pioflt rates were an inflation-related  anomaly. Profit rates prior to
1989  were a better guide to predicting erterprise profitability  as high inflation  rates moved into the past.
VIII. THE CURRENT  FIsCAL  CRISIS:  POLICY  OPTIONS  FOR INCREASING TAx REVENUES
Tle planned govermnent balance  for 1992, based on the 1992 budget, was a deficit amounting
to 5% of GDP. It now appears that this target will be overshot, and the cumulative  deficit for 1992 will
be 8% of GDP or more.  In this section I want to discuss some of the policy options available  on the
revenue side.
A.  VAT and turnover tax
VAT will probably  be introduced  in mid-1993. It will replace the existing  turnover tax. It seem
clear that VAT should be aimed at raising more revenue that the turnover tax it replaces. Currently, the
turnover tax labilities  (excluding  taxes on alcohol, tobacco and petroleum products) of the enterprise
sector amount to about 10% of enterprise sector surplus."  That is, VAT (excluding excise taxes on
alcohol etc.) levelled at an average rate of 10% would raise about the same amount of revenue as the
existing  turnover  tax.  If we allow  for zero-rating  of VAT on exports (say 1/3 of value added),  this would
put VAT that simply replaced turnover  tax revenues at an average rate of something  like 15%.
18.  Calculated  from 1991 data as follows  (see also Figurs  2-3). Total turnover tax revenues  * 60% = >  appi. revenues
excluding  alcohol, tobacco, petroleum  products.  Enterprise  sector surplus  - basic wage bill + bonuses  + payol
taxes + profit tax + dividend + TIP tax + retained profit + turnover  tax + real  estate  tax.PoLh Fbcal Crisb  21
Table 8:  Enterprise Taxation and the Government Budget:
Foreca,sts behind the Budget Laws vs. Actual Outcomes
1990 Budget  1991  Budget
Forecast Actual  Forecast  Actual
Profitability  as a % of  18.6  23.7  23.5  7.1
sales at producer prices
Profit tax as a % of  6.1  8.5  9.2  4.5
sales at producer prices
Unit labor costs  16.9  18.1  16.8  22.6
Amortisation  deductions  1.9  3.4  6.8  6.8
as a % of sales
at producer prices
Profitability  before  20.5  27.1  30.3  13.9
amortisation  deductions
as d % of sales
at producer prices
Payroll taxes as a % of  6.2  6.6  6.3  8.6
sales at producer prices
Profit + payroll taxes  12.3  15.1  15.5  13.1
as a % of sales
at producer prices
Notes:  "Profit" = Historical cost profit ("financial  result").
Coverage of the enterprise sector differs slightly
from previous tables.
This  is already close to  European levels, but an average rate of 20% or more seemns  not
unreasonable. Again allowing  for exports, increasing  the average VAT rdte by 5% would raise revenues
amounting  to an additional 1-2 percent of GDP - a significant  but not a huge amount.  To compensate
for the entire drop in the taxation of the inflation  bias, by contrast, VAT would have to be introduced
at an average rate of something  like 30%, which is not practical.
A useful interim measure for the period until the introduction  of VAT would be an increase in
the existing turnover tax. This tax arnounted  to about 7% of sales in 1988-89  but fell to 5% in 1990 and
increased only slightly in 1991 to 5.5%.  The reasons for the fall in revenues are not clear; the tax take22  Polish  Fiscal Crisis
from alcohol/tobacco/petroleum  fell by about as much as the take from remaining goods.  In any case
a rcturn to pre-1990 tax levels certainly seems feasible and could be implemented  almost immediately.
This would raise revenues by 1.5% to 2% of GDP.  VAT could then be introduced at rates that would
maintain  this revenue.
B.  Payroll taxes
In 1992, the wage tax was replaced with a personal income  tax (Prl)  and the social security tax
rate was raised from 43% to 45%.  Given the deficit being run by the state pension scheme, another
increase in the social security tax rate would probably be easier to support politically  than an increase in
PIT and would straightforward  to implement. An increase to 50% (both Hungary and the CSFR have
similar rates) would raise revenue amounting  to about 3/4 of one percent of GDP.
C.  Profit tax
In my view it would be wise to keep an historical-cost  based profit tax because it acts as an
"automatic  stabilizer". If the government  fails to get control of the budget  deficit and is forced to finance
it using inflationary  means, then taxation of the inflation  bias will keep the deficit smaller than it would
otherwise be.  (Indeed, the budget was more or less in balance  by the end of the 1989 inflation  for just
this reason.)
The importance of this automatic stabilizer can be considerable, as the following calculation
demonstrates. Inventories in the enterprise sector amount to about 15% of C(DP. Assuming a steady
inflation rate of X% p.a. and an average profit tax rate of 33%, annual tax revenue from the inflation
bias is about .05*X% of GDP (.33*.15*X), i.e. each time the inflation rate increases by  10%, tax
revenues increase by about 'h of one percent of GDP.  Inflation is currently running at about 30% p.a.
If it increases to 70%, say, the increase  in the inflation  bias would (ceteris  paribus) bring in art  extra 2%
of GDP in profit tax revenue.  19
To increase profit tax revenue simply by raising the tax rate is not practical in the absence of
other changes because  the tax base is already eroded. An obvious alternative  is to try to redress one of
the mistakes of 1991, namely the indexing  of amortization  deductions. Inflation has already taken care
of this to some extent (there was no major reindexation at the start of  1992, and nominal monthly
deductions are about what they were in 1991), but there is still some scope for manoeuvre here.
A radical  step would be to reduce drastically or even abolish entirely  amortization  deductions  for
state-owned  enterprises  for fixed capital acquired  prior to 1990, i.e. before  the start of the transition from
socialism. When  transition started, these enterprises  became~  worker-controlled  firms using capital which
was inherited  from the communist  period.  Since labor is now the residual claimant (and will be until
19.  For ths  to work,  the stock of enterprise payables  to uic budget (beck  uLxes)  mu&, -.  ,auc(ed to inflarion  u  I believe
is the case (unpaid  taxes accumulate  penalty interest linked to the going interest rate).  In the absence  of infJaion-
indexation,  the loss of real revenue  via the Tanzi effect would cancel  the fiscal  bonus from taxation of paper capital
gains on inventories. (As of May 1992, the enterprise sector's stock of unpaid taxes to the stock  wu  about 1/3 the
stock of inventories, i.e.  about the profit tax rate.)  Of course, the government  must also actually  be succsful  in
collecting  the taxes.Polish Flcal  CrUia  23
privatization),  it is peculiar that these firms are given a tax break on top of the free use of state-owned
capital; if anything, they should be paying for the use of the capital.'
A different rationale for  distinguishing between pre-1990 and  post-1990 investment in the
depreciation  regulations, 2"  and one that applies  to private as well as state-owned  firms, is that the book
value of pre-1990 capital is not liable to be a good guide to their economic  value, and one can readily
argue that one can start a fundamental  system change  with a clean slate. Thus pre-1990 investment  could
be allowed to depreciate slowly, and/or less than 100% of the value of the capital could be deductible;
post-1990 investment  could be allowed to depreciate more quickly, and kept 100% deductible.  The
definition  of 'pre-1990" and "post-1990"  would ideally  be the purchase  date of the capital and not when
it was manufactured, because many new private firms purchase used equipment from state firms.
Unfortunately, this would encourage (small and medium-sized)  firms to maximize their deductions by
reorganizing  themselves into new firms, including  selling their pre-1990 fixed capital to the new firm u
part of the reorganization.
How much revenue would be raised by these changes would depend on the exact rule changa
chosen, but a rough upper limit is simple to calculate.  If all amortization allowances were simply
removed, and the increase in profit were taxed at the average rate of 37  %, revenue amounting  to about
1.5% of GDP would be raised.  Unless  the government  is willing  to strongly discourage  investment,  the
revenue raised by adjusting  a mortization  allowances  would be unlikely to exceed 1/2 of 1% of GDP.
To conclude:  an increase in tax revenues  from the enterprise  sector seems practical, but could  not
alone solve thb buidget  crisis.  Additional  revenues of 2-3% of GD" at most seem attainable. There is
furthermore a medium- to long-term problem, namely that as the state sector stagnates/shrinks  and the
emerging  private sector grows, the tax net will get leakier and leakier. There seems no alternative  but
for the government to try to get control of the social security portion of the budget, notably pensions.
But this is beyond this scope of this paper.
20.  One possibility  would be the following:  (1) abolish  the dividend  tax and disallow  amortization  deductions  for capitl
acquired for 1 January 1990; (2) make state-owned  enterprises pay to the state a rental charge for statowned  fixed
capital,  i.e.  fixed capital acquired before 1 January 1990; this rental charge would be deductible for profit tax
purposes. The easiest  way to do this would be to set the rental charge as (some or all of) the amount of capital
amuruzo.  l%lis  would amount  to making  enterprises  pay their amorization  deductions  on pro-1990  fixeo capital  to
the state, and continuing  to deduct  them from taxable  profit.  But the political  obstacle to implementing  this weme
are  probably  insurnountable.
21.  1 understand  this is already  happening.24  Polish  F&cal  Criis
APPENDIX  1:
THE RELATIONSHIP  BETWEEN  HISTORICAL  COST PROFIT,
CASH FLOw AND  INVENTORIES:  A SERIES  OF EXAMPLES
In this appendix,  I present a series of simple examples  of how historical cost profit, net cash flow
from current operations, and inventories  valudi at historical cost (purchase  prices) are related.
The basic data are presented in Table A.  1.  To make things easier, we make a number of
simplifying  assumptions.
There are no costs other than material costs.
There are no amortization  deductions.
The firm holds inventories  of materials  only. There are no inventories  of finished  goods/work-in-
progress.  Everything  that is produced  is sold.
Inventories  are valued at purchase price.
The firm is operating in an inflationary  environment,  as is evidenced  by the purchase  prices for
the materials it holds: one unit was purchased at a price of 10, one unit at a price of 20, and the price
this period is 30.
In the example, the firm holds the same number of physical units (2) of materials  at the start and
the end of the period.  Real inventory accumulation is zero.  As we shall see,  nominal inventory
accumulation  will depend on precisely how the firm does its accounting.
The firm has three different options foz how it calculates historical cost profit and the value of
the closing  stock of inventories. The three options  correspond  to the three different prices it has paid for
the materials it held: 10, 20 or 30.  The lower the price chosen for materials used in production, the
larger the historical cost  profit for  the period,  and the  larger the  figure for  nominal inventory
accumulation.  The examples show that no matter which of the three options is chosen, the basic
accounting  identity  still holds:
Net cash flow from current operations = historical cost profit - nominal inventory  accumulation
(Recall  we have assumed no depreciation.) The intuition  is that if the price of materials  used in the HCA
profit calculation  is low, HCA profit is high but so is inventory accumulation. These two effects cancel
in the accounting  identity.
The fourth example shows what happens if inventories are revalued during the current period.
Here, total HCA profit contains an inflation bias since the capital gains resulting from the inventory
revaluation  are counted as profits (this is the Polish practice).  Indeed, the inflation  bias in total HCA
profit is largest when inventories are revalued because all the paper capital gains are realized at once.
But again, this inflation bias is also captured in nominal inventory accumulation, and the accounting
identity, when applied to total HCA profit, will yield the correct figure for cash flow.Polish  Fiucai  Crisis  25
TABLE A.1:
THE RELATIONSHIP  BErWEEN  HisrolocAL  CosT PROFT, CASH  FLOW,
AND  INVENTORIES:  A SERIES  OF EXAMPLES
Basic Accounting  Information
Quantity  Price  Value
Stock of materials  on 1.1
1  10  10
1  0  aI
Total:  2  30
Units produced and sold  1  40  40
Materials consumed  in production  1
Materials purchased  1  30  30
Calculation  of Net Cash Flow from Current Operations
Cash flow  =  sales - purchases  of materials  40-30
- 10
Calculation  of HCA Profit
Accounting  Option 1:
Materials consumed  in production  1  10  10
HCA profit  =  sales - cost of materials used in  40-10
producing  the units sold  - 30
Stock of materials on 31.12
1  20  20
1  30  S
Total:  2  50
Inventory  accumulation, 1.1-31.12  50-30
=  20
Accounting  identity: cash flow =  HCA profit-  30-20
inventory accumulation  =  1026  Polih F;sal Crisis
Table A. 1 (continued)
Quantity  Price  Value
Accounting Qption 2:
Materials consumed  in production  1  20  20
HCA profit =  sales - cost of materials used in  40-20
producing the units sold  =  20
Stock of materials  on 31.12
1  10  10
1  30  3
Total:  2  40
Inventory  accumulation, 1.1-31.12  40-30
=  10
Accounting identity: cash flow =  HCA profit-  20-10
inventory accumulation  =  10
Accounting  Option 3#
Materials consumed  in production  3  30  30
HCA profit =  sales - cost of materiVls  used in  40-30
producing the units sold  =  10
Stock of materials  on 31.12
1  10  10
1  20  29
Total:  2  30
Inventory accumulation,  1.1-31.12  40-30
= 0
Accounting identity: cash flow  =  HCA profit-  10-0
inventory  accumulation  - 10PoLh FTcal Crbk  27
Table A. 1 (continued)
Quantity  Price  Value
Accounting  Option 4: Inventory Revaluation
Stock of materials on 1.1 following  revaluation
1  30  30
1  30  3Q
Total:  2  60
Extraordinary  profits from inventory  revaluation  60-30
=  30
Materials consumed in production  1  30  30
HCA  profit  from  sales  =  sales  - cost  of  40-30
materials  used  =  10
Total  HCA  profit  =  profit  from  sales  +  10+30
extraordinary  profits  -40
Stock of materials  on 31.12
1  30  30
1  30  la
Total:  2  60
Inventory  accumulation, 1.1-31.12  60-30
= 30
Accounting identity: cash flow =  HCA profit-  40-30
inventory  accumulation  - 1028  Polish  Thcal Crisi
APPENDIX  2:
INVENTORIES  AND  THE  INFLATION  BiAS IN T1E POLISH  ENTERPRISE  SECrOR
Polish enterprises report monthly on  their inventories.  Inventories are divided into four
categories: (1) materials;  (2) work-in-progress  (WIP); (3) finished  goods; (4) 'commodities' ("towary").
The difference  between finished  goods and 'commodities' depends on the reporting unit and not on the
nature  of the goods. An enterprise  holding inventorias  of goods which it has produced itself reports these
goods as  "finished goods"; an enterprise holding inventories of finished goods which it purchased
complete and will resell reports these goods as "commodities".
This distinction  between  goods  produced  and goods  marketed  is also made in the output  statistics.
The definition  of "sales of own production" includes  sales of finished goods valued at their sales price,
and commodities  valued by their profit margin (the difference  between the purchase price and the sales
price). This is particularly important  for the retail trade sector, where most sales are of commodities  and
hence "sales of own production"  is something  like 1/6 of total turnover. Figures on total turnover in the
enterprise sector began to be pub!ished only in 1991.  For 1991 as a whole, total turnover was 46%
greater than "sales of own production".
Inventories  are valued at "cost".  Materials and commodities  are valued at their purchase  price.
Finished goods and work-in-progress  are valued at their (historical)  cost of production.  The valuation
of finished goods and WIP does not include certain general costs which are not attributed to specific
production  activities (notably  depreciation  of fixed capital). In 1988-91, the value of inventories in the
enterprise sector typically broke down as follows: finished goods, 5-15%;  commodities, 25-40%;
materials, 40-55%; work-in-progress,  10-20%.
The most direct way to estimate  the average life in inventory  is to calculate  the ratio of the value
of inventories  at sales prices to turnover.  We do this as follows:
Materials: we add in approximate  valued added to get the total value of the sold products that
will embody  them.
Finished goods and commodities: we add in missing costs and a profit margin to get to value at
sales prices.
WIP:  I assume simply that the value added to a unit of WIP lies half-way  between the value
added to a unit of materials and a unit added to finished  goods and commodities.
22.  'Tots, turnover" is calculated  as total income less financial  income and subsidies. Data from Biulel  Statntvcmvz,
No. 2, 1992, p. 47.
23.  Why this is necessary  can be seen from an example  (with no inflation). Consider  an enterprise  which in a steady  sate
purchases  one zloty of materials  and seLs iO zloty  of fin  good  eacn penuu.  It holds the materials  for S periods, aaa
9 zloty of value (labor) in the 6th period, and then sells it r:  cost.  In the steady state it will hold 15 zloty of
inventories:  5 zloty  of materials  and 10  zloty  of finished  goods. To get  the average  life  of inventories  we gross  up
the value  of inventories  of materials  (5 zloty  of materials  will  yield  50  zloty  of final  goods),  add  the value  of finished
goods  (10),  and  divide  by  turnover  per period  (10  zloty). 60 + 10 = 6 periods,  the correct  answer  for  inventory  life.Poish  Fical  Crisis  29
Finally, we divide the total of gross-up inventories  by monthly turnover to get inventory life in
months. Monthly  turnover is approximated  from monthly  sales of own production  plus 46% (see above).
Two methods of grossing up are used.  (1) Materials are grossed-up by the ratio of monthly
material costs to monthly sales of own production. Finished goods and commodities  are gross up by the
ratio of "monthly  costs of own sales'  to monthly sales of own production.  This method will tend to
overstate  somewhat gross-up  inventories because  of  the  downward bias  in  historical  costs.'
(2) Materials are grossed-up  by the ratio of monthly  material expenditures  (i.e. spending  on materials  on
a CF basis) to monthly sales of own production.'  Finished goods and commodities  are grossed-up  by
15%  to allow  for missing costs and a profit margin. This method  will tend to understate  somewhat  gross-
up inventories because  of the inflation  bias in inventories.
The results, on a month-by-month  basis for 1989-90,  are shown in.  Inventory  life is seen to be
between 1.5 and 3 months, with estimates  near the lower end of the range at the end of 1989  (the critical
point estimate).  NB: I do not think the estimates are accurate enough to be able to learn much from
interpretations  of month-to-month  movements.
A check on this estimate is to calculate the implicit inventory life from the estimated inflation
biases and observed costs.  The idea is most clearly expressed if we consider the steady state (constant
output, costs and inventories).  In the steady state, inventories =  ctC, where a  is the inventory life.
Furthermore, the paper capital gain on inventories (the inflation bias) is just the inflation rate times
.nventories, and so
lB - QC  * p
This equation, together with the estimates  of the inflation  bias, can be used to calculate  the implied life
in inventories. The results are variable  but are generally  one month  or less. I conclude  that the estimated
life in inventory in the Polish enterprise sector is 1-3 months.
Inventory  price deflators are constructed from weighted averages of the industrial price index.
The weights are calculated using a rough estimate of the distribution over time of value added in
inventories. These are derived as follows. The ratio of total value to the value of materials in finished
goods is about 2 (i.e. it takes one zloty of materials and one zloty of value added to make 2 zloty of
finished  goods).  Reported inventories  of materials are roughly equal to reported inventories  of finished
goods and commodities. Consider now a simple example. Life in inventory is 3 periods.  Production
is instantaLiowus.  One zloty of materials is held for 2 periods, one zloty of value is then added in
production, the resulting  finished  good is held for one more period and then sold.  In a steady state with
no inflation, inventories  will be 2 zloty of materials + 2 zloty of finished goods = 4 zloty.  (Note that
both the shares of materials and finished  goods in total inventories and the ratio of materials to value
W.,.  Both inventoriea  and  costs arm  biated downwards,  but (assuming  LIFO)  the  is  gratcr  fo. .osts bc.._'.-  .osts
of sold production reflect the fuU  time spent in production  (inventory  life).
25.  Material expenditur  amr  calculated  using an identity similar  to the CF identity (see Schaffer 1992).  There  is a
residual  inflation  bias remining in thi  esimate of matrial  expenditures,  but it is likely  to be small.30  PoPth fthal  Crb
added  in finished  goods  are what  we typically  observe.) For simplicity,  assume  that  the price indexes
available  are period-average  indexes. A weighted  price index  should  therefore  be
t  =  ( ~~P112  + Pll  + Pi + P,  ) / 4
=  ( pf2 + Pj  + 2p,  /4
Figure A2.1
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,..Method  1  *Method  2
Period  t is weighted  more heavily because  of the value added in that period.
To implement  this, I weight  the price level in the last 1/3 of the time in inventory  double  the
weight  of the price level  in the first 2/3 of the time  in inventory.  The price index  used is the industrial
sales  price index, an end-month  index. To get the average  price level  for the first 2/3 and the last 1/3
of time in inventory  I assume  a straight-line  increase  in the price level. The inventory  price indexes  are
calculated  as {  (average  price level  in the first 2/3 of time  in inventory)  + 2*(average  price  level in the
last 1/3  of time in inventory)  )  +  3.
Three separate  indexes  are calculated,  corresponding  to inventory  lives of one month, two
months,  and  three months. These  price indexes  are applied  to the inventory  series  to get a time series
for real inventories  in constant  prices. Real inventories  are used to calculate  monthly  real inventory
accumulation  in constant  prices;  this is converted  into  current  prices  using  the industrial  price index  to
get monthly  real inventory  accumulation  m the prices  of that month. Monthly  inventory  accumulation
is then  summed  to get annual  inventory  accumulation.  The resulting  estimate  of "real  annual  inventory
accumulation  in current year prices" is litfle  changed  if instead  we calculated  real annual  inventory
accumulation  and converted this into current year prices using an annual average price deflator.PoLis  ucwa  Cris  31
Berg and Sachs  (1992)  have  argued  that inventory  accumulation  may  be blued downwards  by
ownership  transformation,  particularly  in retail  trade. Old  firms  close  down,  their  inventories  transferred
to new firms,  and the new firms  may  not have  been  caught  in the statistical  reporting  net. This is not
a problem  for the derivation  of the inflation  bias, however,  so long as the liquidation  of inventories  is
reflected  in the profit/loss  accounts  of enterprises.21
Finally  we use the identity
EB  *  HCA  + A - CF - IA
to calculate  the inflation  bias.
The reason  for preferring  this method  to calculate  the inflation  bias is bocas  the variability  in
the magnitudes  of the estimates  of inventory  accumulation  is small compared  to the magnitudes  of the
other  variables  (i.e. EB  + IA is a big number  compared  to the variation  in the estimates  of IA).
A rough check  on the reasonableness  of the inflation  bias estimates  is as follows.  Inventories
in 1991  were about 15%  of annual  sales. Inflation  was fairly steady  during  the year, and December-
December  industrial  price inflation  was 36%.  Capital  gains on inventories  should  therefore  have
amounted  to about  5-6% of annual  sales,  which  is just our estimate  for the inflation  bias in 1991. TIs
approximation  also works  well for 1988,  but less  so for 1989  and 1990, when inflation  was high and
variable and inventories  were de-cumulating;  the resulting  approximations  of the inflation  bias are
considerably  hiiher than  those  calculated  using  the main  method  presented  above.
A shortcut  calculation  of the inflation  bias in period  t can be had simply  by indexing  costs  for
inflation:
l,  - I  c,
Pt-V
where  p,  is the  price  level  at time  t and  N is the average  age  of inventories,  which  we approximate  as  just
one-half  an assumed  average  inventory  life. If we do this for a variety  of choices  of inventory  life we
find  that  for an inventory  life of one month  the estimate  of the inflation  bias is close  to those  calculated
above  for all years; an assumed  inventory  life of 2 months  or more  gives  impossibly  high  figures  for the
inflation  bias in 1989  and 1990.
26.  Interengly,  in the molt  affeed  year  (1990),  the  figures  for  inventorie  hed  on lJanury  reported  monthly  by
nterpris in socialzed reta  trade  actuay incresed slightly in  the course  of dth  year.  he  aistl  net appretly
caught  more (or larger)  socialized  retail  tde  enterprie  as the year  progrmsed.32  PoUlh  Fbcal Crksiu
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